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Tim A. Mickler
Department of Political Science, Leiden University, AK Leiden, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I analyse the allocation of legislators to specialised committees in
Dáil Éireann. Committees are privileged decision-making arenas: Committee
members have, once assigned, the right and duty to work on issues within
their jurisdiction. It is, therefore, important to understand which factors
influence the assignment process. In what has been the most thorough
analysis hitherto, Hansen [(2011). A random process? Committee assignments
in Dail Eireann. Irish Political Studies, 26(3), 345–360] has found very little
patterns explaining this process in the Dáil. The study uses the congressional
theories of legislative organisation as heuristic devices to deduce several
rationales of the assignment process. The role of parliamentary party groups
in the assignment process is highlighted. The hypotheses are tested by means
of a multiple-membership multilevel model on committee assignments across
multiple legislative periods (1992–2011). The results are backed up with
evidence from 22 interviews I conducted with Irish legislators. Contradicting
earlier assessments of the assignment process, several factors increase the
likelihood of being assigned to a committee. There is strong evidence for a
reassignment pattern. Additionally, a legislator’s occupational background
matters in the assignment process. For the ongoing discussion about the
applicability of the congressional theories outside of the U.S., my study
provides evidence for the usefulness of the U.S. theories.
KEYWORDS Legislative organisation; congressional theories; committee assignments; distributive
theory; informational theory; partisan theory; Dáil Éireann
The significance of committees in parliaments
As most legislatures around the world, Dáil Éireann relies on a system of
specialised committees to allow for an efficient policy-making process. Even
though the importance of committees is widely recognised, we know rela-
tively little about how legislative work is organised within committees, with
the exception of the U.S. Congress and U.S. state legislatures. Not much
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literature is available on the functioning of committees in other national leg-
islatures even though this provides important insight into decision-making
processes and power relations within legislatures. In particular, understanding
the ‘process by which members are assigned to committees is of the greatest
importance’ (Rohde and Shepsle 1973: 889). For the Dáil, Hansen (2011) pre-
sents the hitherto most thorough analysis. First, Hansen analyses participation
in committees (all committees pooled) in a period of 1982 and 2010. In a
second part, the assignment to important committees is analysed in two
multivariate models. Although some patterns are found, most notably with
regard to sector knowledge (Hansen 2011: 354) the author concludes that
‘the results point towards committee assignments in Dáil Éireann happening
rather randomly’ (Hansen 2011: 346).
To contribute to the debate ‘how are members assigned to legislative
committees in the Dáil and what criteria play a role in the assignment
process?’, I present an analysis of all committee assignments in the 27th to
the 31st Dáil. My study differs from the analysis by Hansen (2011) in terms
of analysed committees, the period of investigation and the data used for
the analysis. A combination of quantitative and qualitative data is used to
broaden our understanding of this issue. The results presented in this study
indicate that assignment patterns in the Dáil are not so random after all,
but can be described by a mixture of reoccurring and stable factors.
These results have wider theoretical implications. Scholars focusing on
committee assignments outside of the U.S. usually build on ‘imported’ the-
ories of legislative organisation which originate from the U.S. Congress
(usually labelled distributive, informational and partisan theory which
Hansen 2011 also applies). The question ‘how well do the predictions of the
congressional theories travel to legislatures outside the United States?’ is as
yet unanswered (see, e.g. Martin 2014a). The non-finding of Hansen’s study
leads him to question the usefulness of the congressional theories (see also
Yordanova 2011). Contradicting these views, the evidence presented in this
study indicates that the congressional theories are more useful to understand
committees in legislatures with strong parliamentary party groups (such as
the Dáil) than what is discussed in Hansen (2011) and Yordanova (2011).
Committees in Dáil Éireann
The Dáil relies on several committees of which Select Committees are the
primary committees to subdivide jurisdictional policy areas. The committee
stage is the third (of five) legislative stages and follows the debate stage in
which the Bill is approved in principle (or not). During the committee stage,
the draft legislation is debated line by line. Amendments can be proposed,
but only the responsible minister decides to accept amendments or not.
The bill is then reported back for the fourth stage (Report Stage). The fifth
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stage (Final Stage) concludes with a vote on the passage of the bill. The fourth
and fifth stages are usually only a formality.
In principle, each house has the ability to establish a committee to examine
any matter or issue. However, in reality, the most influential variable to deter-
mine the committees’ jurisdictions is the government formation and select
committees tend to mirror one or several ministerial departments. There is
little consistency regarding which committees are established from one
general election to another. In the 30th Dáil (2007–2011) no less than 22 com-
mittees were established. The large number of committees relative to the
number of legislators received criticism during the 2011 election campaign.
The newly elected government addressed this by reducing the number of
committees. In order to still be able to deal with the specific legislation for
each department, the Dáil introduced select sub-committees which meet
only to consider issues in accordance with the terms of reference that estab-
lished them.
Each Dáil Select Committee and Select Committee appointed by the upper
chamber, Seanad Éireann, form a Joint Committee to avoid duplication of
oversight. The Joint Committee can consider and report on the need for legis-
lation or expenditure and international agreements that do not involve a
charge on the public purse. In case a charge on the public purse is involved,
only the Dáil Select Committee can consider the proposals. Oireachtas com-
mittees also engage in issues they put on their own agenda. Some commit-
tees limit themselves mainly to their input during the committee stages of
Bills, others try to have a more active role by holding discussions on particular
topics and inviting stakeholders, e.g. non-governmental organisations. Table 1
shows the established specialised committees at the beginning of the 31st
legislative period.
A review of theories and literature
Although a large body of relevant literature on legislative organisation is avail-
able, theories on legislative organisation – of which committees are a central
feature – are mainly restricted to those developed for the analysis of the U.S.
Congress. These are the theories that researchers first turn to: ‘Analysing non-
US legislative bodies without drawing extensively on the literature of the US
Congress is nearly impossible’ (Hansen 2011: 348).
Theories of legislative organisation: a congressional bias
The distributive theory of legislative organisation argues that committees are
established to provide legislators with means to distribute particularistic
benefits to their constituents. Two key assumptions are that legislatures are
decentralised institutions which are dominated by geographical concerns
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and that individual legislators are not heavily constrained by partisan forces
within the legislature (Shepsle 1978). In order to facilitate their goal of re-elec-
tion, legislators engage in logrolling, i.e. the mutually beneficial exchange of
influence in issues of high salience for their own advantage (gains from
trade). This, however, creates a dilemma as legislators fear prospective defec-
tion. The committee system is seen as the solution to this problem. By dividing
policy areas, committees create a decentralised agenda control system that
enables legislators to facilitate gains from trade and maintain their bargains.
The composition of committees is predicted to be unrepresentative of their
parent body: primarily those legislators join a committee who have a ‘stake’
in the committee’s jurisdiction.
The informational theory of legislative organisation departs from different
assumptions of the functioning of Congress: Policies are selected in the ‘pres-
ence of substantial uncertainty about their consequences upon implemen-
tation’ (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990: 533) and policies cannot be enacted
without the consent of the majority of the legislature’s members. This perspec-
tive argues that legislative institutions (such as committees) make legislative
specialisation possible and, therefore, help to reduce uncertainty. With regard
to assignment patterns, the theory predicts that Congress uses the
Table 1. Specialised Committees established at the beginning of the 31st Dáil (2011–
2016).
Dáil Committee Shadowed department(s) TDs
Committee of Public Accounts – 13
Communications, Natural Resources and
Agriculture
Communications, Energy and Natural
Resources
15
Environment, Transport, Culture and the
Gaeltacht
Environment, Community and Local
Government
21
Transport, Tourism and Sport
Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht
European Union Affairs – 9
Foreign Affairs and Trade Foreign Affairs and Trade 9
Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Finance 21
Public Expenditure and Reform
Department of the Taoiseach
Agriculture, Food and Marine




Justice, Defence and Equality Justice and Equality 9
Defence
Health and Children Health 15
Children and Youth Affairs
Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement – 15
Investigations, Oversight and Petitions – 15
Source: Own depiction. Due to intermediate changes in June 2012 which mostly refer to reshuffling and
re-naming the committee system has been altered again. The Committee on Environment, Transport,
Culture and the Gaeltacht while the relevant responsibilities of the Committee on Communications,
Natural Resources and Agriculture’ were assumed by either the newly established Committee on Agri-
culture, Food and the Marine or the Committee on Transport and Communications.
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‘endogenously selected institutional devices and resources to exploit the
special talents of its exogenously elected members’ (Gilligan and Krehbiel
1990: 533).
Despite being contradictory in their predictions, the informational and dis-
tributive theories share one common assumption: The absence of partisan
organisation as a major force in the organisation of the U.S. Congress. The par-
tisan theory of legislative organisation contradicts this assumption and views
parliamentary party groups as driving forces in Congress. Committees are
agents of the majority parliamentary party group and become part of the
reward system of the parliamentary party group leadership. Loyalty to the par-
liamentary party group becomes an important determinant of committee
assignments: Especially in committees that have an effect on the national per-
ception of the party the preferences of the committee members ‘will tend to
have contingents that are microcosms of their party caucus’ (Cox and McCub-
bins 1993: 199).
The debate on committees
Some U.S. studies support the predictions of the distributive theory, especially
when taking into consideration a legislator’s constituency characteristics (e.g.
Shepsle 1978; Adler and Lapinski 1997). Other studies found empirical support
for the informational theory in Congress (e.g. Krehbiel 1992; Hamm et al.
2011). The role of parliamentary party groups has been highly disputed (e.g.
Krehbiel 1993). Kanthak (2009), for example, concludes that loyalists are
more likely to be assigned to desirable committees.
The study of committees outside of the U.S. did not gain momentum
until the late 1990s. Initial research focused primarily on the European Par-
liament (e.g. Whitaker 2005; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009, 2011). National
legislatures did not undergo similar systematic analyses for a long time.
Some studies argued that committee assignments in national legislatures
are affected by electoral rules or candidate selection procedures (Stratmann
and Baur 2002; Crisp et al. 2009). More recent studies of national legisla-
tures make explicit use of the congressional theories (e.g. Hansen 2010;
Fujimura 2012; Mickler 2013; Raymond and Holt 2014), including a study
on the Dáil (Hansen 2011). These studies have shown variation in assign-
ment patterns but have, overall, indicated stable country-specific arrange-
ments. The analysis by Hansen (2011) does not point towards similar
patterns in Ireland. Hansen (2011: 358) concludes that ‘it is not possible
to explain with much success which TDs are assigned to which committees,
at least not in terms of ranking’, although sector knowledge seems to
account for some committee assignments. This also lets him question the
usefulness of the congressional theories for the study of national legisla-
tures outside of the U.S.
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Still, the congressional theories remain the dominant perspectives on how
committees work and need to be taken into consideration, even within the
European parliamentary context. However, in order to apply the congressional
theories to this ‘new’ setting, a redefinition of the role of parliamentary party
groups is necessary. The influence of partisan forces on individual legislators
in the U.S. Congress has been a bone of contention, but in a European context
‘no one would seriously consider any alternative to political parties as the
most important political coordination mechanism’ (Müller 2000: 316). Parlia-
mentary party groups in these legislatures are ‘powerful floor coalitions,
capable of disciplining their members and passing their programs, […] effec-
tively dominating the legislative agenda and taking responsibility for the final
legislative product’ (Cox and McCubbins 1993: 5).
This is also true for the Dáil. However, this does not confirm the supremacy
of the partisan theory by default. I argue that the informational and distribu-
tive perspectives are also applicable to legislatures with strong parliamentary
party groups if we relax their (congressional) assumption of the weakness of
parliamentary party groups. The main organisational implications by both the-
ories present perfectly feasible strategies that parliamentary party groups can
pursue. For example, parliamentary party groups can use the committee
system primarily to facilitate the re-election chances of their MPs by offering
them the possibility to cater to outside groups via their committee member-
ship (as predicted by the distributive theory). Additionally, parliamentary party
groups in all legislatures, including the Dáil, have to take decisions under
uncertainty. Using the specialised committee system to facilitate the legisla-
tive process by ‘tapping the talents’ of their legislators is certainly a feasible
strategy which parliamentary party groups can pursue.
To summarise, committees are either organised to offer particularistic
benefits to groups outside parliament (distributive rationale), part of the
reward system of parliamentary party groups to induce loyalty (partisan
rationale) or provide means to deal with the workload of the parliamentary
party group and improve efficiency (informational rationale). This framework
has clear predictions for the institutional design and can be used to identify
the different conditions which cause the prevalence of a theory in a given
context.
Hypotheses committee assignments: who gets what and why?
The distributive theory predicts committees to be used to serve interests
outside parliament of individual MPs. Earlier studies (see Yordanova 2009)
tested the effect of links to interest groups in the assignment process.
However, after checking the annual reports from the website of the Oireach-
tas it was concluded that this variable is impossible to test in the Dáil. Almost
no Teachta Dála (TD) has such external interests (constantly above 94 per cent
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of legislators without any remunerated position, see Appendix). Due to the
impossibility to include these external connections in the analysis, I test the
distributive rationale by analysing whether individual legislators rely on the
committee systems to serve their electorate and secure their re-election. A
re-election principle in the assignment process suggests that those
members of a parliamentary party group join the committees which corre-
spond to an ‘electoral demand’ of a TD.
Hypothesis 1: TDs are more likely to serve on committees that correspond
to their electoral link with constituencies.
The informational theory highlights the importance of specialised, efficiency
improving committees. A ‘rational legislature is one that efficiently taps the
special talents of its legislators’ (Krehbiel 1992: 136). Parliamentary party
groups comprise legislators with various backgrounds. This makes the
appointment of members who can specialise at low cost in a policy area to
the corresponding committee a valid strategy.
Hypothesis 2: TDs are more likely to serve on committees in which they can
specialise at low cost.
The partisan theory highlights the proactive role of the parliamentary party
group leadership which ‘reserves’ seats on some committees for particular
legislators. One factor that is predicted to structure this process is the
number of legislative periods. Parliamentary party group leaders may prefer
experienced legislators on committees whose policy-area concerns an impor-
tant issue of the party and may withhold other from serving on them. This is
done to increase the electoral success of the party at the next election.
Hypothesis 3: TDs who have served for more legislative periods are more
likely to serve on committees whose jurisdiction concerns an important
area of the party.
An additional hypothesis of the rationale tests the effect of individual legis-
lators’ loyalty to the likelihood of being assigned to important committees.
Following the same reasoning as Hypothesis 3, legislators who are ideologi-
cally closer to the parliamentary party group are expected to be rewarded
by the parliamentary party group leadership.
Hypothesis 4: TDs who are closer to the ideological mean of the
parliamentary party group are more likely to serve on committees whose
jurisdiction concerns an important area of the party.
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Method of the study
This analysis makes use of a mixed method approach. Committee assign-
ments are first analysed by means of a statistical analysis to find patterns in
the assignment process and to understand which selection criteria explain
why legislators serve on a particular committee. Given the particular data
characteristics (1. All legislators are assigned to at least one committee.1;
2. Some legislators are assigned to multiple committees; 3. Committees
differ with regard to their importance to parliamentary party groups), a mul-
tiple membership multilevel model is applied to the data.2 In multiple mem-
bership models, lower level units are nested within multiple higher level units
from the same classification (Browne et al. 2001). This makes them appropriate
choices for the data structure in which TDs are not ‘neatly’ clustered within
one higher level group (committees).
However, solely focusing on quantitative methods makes null-findings very
likely. To validate the statistical analysis and to provide further insight into the
initial results, the results are cross-checked with evidence from semi-struc-
tured interviews with 22 legislators. As the study of committee assignments
in national parliaments outside of the U.S. Congress is still in its infancy
(Hansen 2011), using qualitative evidence to evaluate parts of the committee
assignments is worthwhile to broaden our understanding of the processes
and gains new insights (see also Settembri and Neuhold 2009; Mickler 2013).
The interviews were conducted by the author in December 2014 in Dublin
and focused on the formal allocation of members and the criteria in the
assignment process. It should be noted that the interviews were conducted
with current incumbents which puts certain limitations on their ability to
evaluate committee assignments prior to their election. Legislators
from every parliamentary party group were interviewed, including indepen-
dent legislators who formed the Technical Group (TG) as an independent
alliance.3
Data set: measuring committee membership and operationalising
the variables
The dependent variable: Assignments and transfers to specialised committees:
The dependent variable measures the membership to specialised commit-
tees, i.e. those that are devoted to specific policy areas and exert both the
control function and the scrutiny of bills. The analysed legislative periods com-
prise the 27th Dáil (1992 election) until the 31st Dáil (2011 election). An analy-
sis across several legislative periods prevents the overestimation of outliers
which might occur in single legislative periods. The 1992 legislative period
marks the starting point of a new committee system after reforms restruc-
tured the number of committees, their jurisdictions and the referral of bills.
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The transition to the new committee system made mid-term in July 1995,
allowed the committee system to leap ‘into life again’ (Gallagher 2005).
Detailed lists on committee memberships (with transfers) are available
online for the 30th Dáil as well as the 31st Dáil (Houses of the Oireachtas
2011). Committee membership lists for the 26th4 – 29th legislative period
were obtained from the Journals Office of the Oireachtas. The data were
coded to establish a complete ‘committee life cycle’ of each legislator and
reflects founding members (assigned at the beginning of the legislative
period) and transfers. For the 31st Dáil, the data include the assignments at
the beginning of the legislative period but not the transfers.
Advantages in knowledge concerning a committees’ subject matter: The infor-
mational rationale predicts that members are assigned to committees who
can specialise at low cost in a given policy area. A TDs prior education and
occupation are valuable assets in this regard. Information on the educational
and occupational background was obtained by coding TDs’ biographies using
the information provided in Nealon’s Guide (Nealon 1992, 1997; Kennedy and
Nealon 2002; Collins and Nealon 2007; Collins 2011). Missing information was
obtained by consulting parliamentary party group or personal homepages.
The job descriptions were summarised in more than 50 general categories
(lawyers, banking industry, civil servant, etc.) and then assigned to each com-
mittee. This demanded a clear cut-off point when a prior education and occu-
pation allow a legislator to specialise ‘at low cost’. The guiding principle was
whether a prior education / occupation would give a TD a relative advantage
compared to a TD who did not have such a training.
Constituency demands: The concept of district demand is impossible to test
in the statistical analysis. Scholars in the U.S. are able to define relatively clear
district types with their highest electoral need. This proved to be highly diffi-
cult for my analysis. For several committees, good indicators for constituency
demand were entirely absent. An obvious example is not only committees
dealing with European Affairs, but also committees dealing with issues con-
cerning women and family are difficult to match to certain constituency
characteristics without over-stretching the concept. The issue of constituency
characteristics is, therefore, addressed in the interviews with TDs.
Parliamentary seniority: To measure parliamentary seniority the number of
legislative periods was counted via Nealon’s Guide and the homepage of the
Dáil.
Legislators’ ideological distance to the parliamentary party group mean: To
test whether legislators who are ideologically closer to the parliamentary
party group mean are disproportionally assigned to more important commit-
tees, fine-grained data on individual legislators is needed. Obtaining such data
are a central problem of legislative research (Loewenberg 2008: 488). Debus
(2009) distinguishes three alternative methods for estimating programmatic
positions of political actors: voting behaviour of politicians, surveys on an
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elite or legislators’ level, or identifying the ideological position of relevant
actors via (hand-coded or automatic) content analysis of relevant documents.
In this study, ideological positions were estimated using the Wordscores tech-
nique (Laver et al. 2003), a computer-assisted content analysis method.
Wordscores was chosen because it has been successfully applied to estimate
policy positions based on legislators’ speeches in the Dáil5, but it also suits the
research goal conceptually. The aim is to position individual legislators with
regard to their proximity relative to their parliamentary party group. Wordscores
compares text pattern in two sets of texts (called ‘reference’ and ‘virgin’ texts).
By assigning scores to ‘reference’ documents which, in this study, indicate the
‘ideal score’ of the parliamentary party group, Wordscores makes this inference
on relative proximity possible. This makes it different from other approaches,
such as the Wordfish technique, which infers scores based on the data. In
this study, the party manifestos for the respective elections are used as refer-
ence texts. The manifestos were obtained from the Irish Election Manifesto
Archive (Pidgeon 2017).6 The party manifestos (i.e. the reference texts) were
scored using the party position scores of the Manifesto Research Group/Com-
parative Manifestos Project (Volkens et al. 2014). Each legislator was compared
to the reference file of the respective parliamentary party group. All speeches
and questions given during the legislative period were used for the analysis.
Table 2 lists the number of analysed legislative speeches.
The final score for each legislator was calculated as the absolute value of
the difference of each legislator’s score to his/her parliamentary party
group’s mean. A higher value implicates a TD who is further away from his/
her parliamentary party group mean and is expected to be less likely to be
allocated to a more important committee.7 The application of Wordscores
made a calculation possible for all legislators.
There are some limitations to this approach. The amount of speeches and
written questions across TDs varies. Additionally, Wordscores as a technique
‘makes no assumptions about syntax but treats any text as a simple bag of
words’ (Scharkow 2011: 5). On a general level, one might question whether it
Table 2. Number of analysed plenary documents, speeches and personal statements.
Country Plenary sessions No analysed speeches and questions
Dáil Éireann
27th (1992–1997) 435 191843
28th (1997–2002) 422 226100
29th (2002–2007) 555 296515
30th (2007–2011) 348 245980
31st (2011–March 2015) 503 297769
Source: Own data set. The data contain all speeches, questions asked during Question Time on Tuesdays,
Wednesdays and Thursdays as well as all written questions addressed to ministers for written reply.
During question time, each TD is allowed to ask the Minister only two questions. There is no limit to
the number of written questions. In 2010, Ministers answered over 35,000 written questions. The end
point of the 31st Dáil was March 2015.
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is possible to infer relative ideological distance based on word choices. While
these considerations cannot be ruled out entirely, the approach suits the
research goal. Those TDs who highlight similar issues in their contributions
will be closer associated than TDs who emphasise different issues. Before
running the analysis, a validity test was carried out. It would be possible that
the speeches of all TDs in a committee would revolve around the topics
covered in this committee and, subsequently, those TDs would have similar
word frequencies. In this case, committee membership would trump parliamen-
tary party group membership. For the interpretation of scores, this would be
highly problematic. However, this is not the case. Across all legislatures and all
parliamentary party groups, legislators from one parliamentary party group
are more closely associated with each other than the committee members.8
Measuring the Relative Importance of Committee: Several hypotheses relate
an effect of factors to the importance of committees. Hansen (2011) ranks all
committees based on the importance of ministerial portfolios. While it is clear
that some committees are more important than others, there is little added
value to account for minor differences between all committees.9 It is only
necessary to understand which committees are of central importance com-
pared to others. Instead, this study relies on the dichotomous distinction
between high-importance and low-importance committees in terms of issue
saliency. The distinction into high or low importance committees is based
on the interviews. Legislators were asked which committees they see as
important for their parliamentary party group. The salience of committees is
generally shared across parties. In the Dáil, the Public Accounts Committee
was unequivocally listed as the most important committee. Committees
dealing with financial issues and the economy are, across all parties, very
salient and thus ranked as those of high importance.10
Committee experience: One control variable is added to the model. Earlier
studies in other legislatures have found patterns of a continuation of commit-
tee membership (see Mickler 2013). Committee experience was measured by
pooling the membership to committees from one immediate prior legislative
period to the next. Aggregating committee memberships across more than
one legislative period would mean an inflation of positive codes. In case com-
mittees were merged legislators of both committees are treated as having
committee experience for the new committee. When committees were split
up, legislators who served on it are coded to have experience for both of
the new committees.
Analysis committee assignment: ‘self-selection’ or leadership-
dominated?
The question arises to what extent the parliamentary party group leadership
autonomously decides on the assignment. In the German Bundestag,
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committee preferences are evaluated via surveys or personal talks. Assign-
ments follow a discussion with the parliamentary party group leadership
(see Mickler 2013). As regards the Irish case, only the legislators of Fine Gael
mentioned being asked about their preferences (Interview Dáil, 141203C).
Fianna Fáil legislators stated that in previous legislative periods (when
numbers were larger), they would ‘tell the whip which committees [they]
would like to be on and the whip would draw up a list’ (Interview Dáil,
141203E; also 141202C). Members of other parliamentary party groups indi-
cated that they never gave any preferences for committees. The procedure
in the Technical Group is special in this regard: legislators wrote their prefer-
ences on a piece of paper in their first meeting. In case only one member
wanted a committee (s)he automatically got it (Interview Dáil, 141201A).
Regardless of whether preferences for committees are gathered or not,
respondents highlighted that the ultimate decision is made by the
parliamentary party group leader (Interview Dáil, 141204C; 141205A). Intervie-
wees compared the role of the leader to that of a ‘football manager selecting
his team’ (Interview Dáil, 141204C, 141202C). This proactive role of the
parliamentary party group leadership in the assignment procedure fits
the partisan rationale. This raises the question: What factors play a role in
the assignment process?
Interpreting the models: what explains assignments to committees in
the Dáil?
The main analysis tests the effect on the membership of committees (including
transfers during the legislative period). For each legislative period, two models
were estimated: Model 1 without committee experience and Model 2 includ-
ing committee experience.11 A separate estimation allows for a clearer analy-
sis of those factors that are linked to a particular theoretical rationale and
remain stable, such as legislators’ prior education or occupation. Committee
experience, on the other hand, is ‘acquired’ by legislators due to their commit-
tee membership in the prior legislative period. Descriptive statistics are shown
in Table 3.
Two group effects are fitted by including varying intercepts for committees
and individual TDs. It was refrained from nesting the observations per Dáil, i.e.
including legislative periods as a part of the nested data structure. Analysing
all legislative periods in one model would be interesting if the established
committees would remain relatively stable across the analysed legislative
terms. However, merging and splitting committees, as well as discontinuing
and newly establishing committees, is very common in the Dáil. The detailed
output for all parliamentary party groups is presented in Table 4. Below for
each hypothesis the result from the analysis is presented, followed by state-
ments from the interviews.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the data set on committee assignments.
Variable n nbr.null Mean SD n nbr.null Mean SD n nbr.null Mean SD
27th Dáil 27th Dáil (post reform) 28th Dáil
Prior education 124 43 0.65 0.48 127 45 0.65 0.48 133 40 0.70 0.46
Prior occupation 124 2 0.98 0.13 127 2 0.98 0.13 133 2 0.99 0.12
External interests 124 124 0 0 127 127 0 0 133 110 0.17 0.38
Committee experience 124 78 0.47 0.71 127 94 0.26 0.44 133 79 0.78 1.20
Ideological distance 124 1 8.96 7.41 127 2 9.27 7.50 133 5 5.41 5.41
Number LPs 124 29 2.97 2.75 127 30 3.17 2.96 133 35 2.76 2.60
29th Dáil 30th Dáil 31st Dáil
Prior education 132 41 0.69 0.47 140 48 0.66 0.48 119 37 0.70 0.47
Prior occupation 132 4 0.97 0.17 140 5 0.96 0.18 119 9 0.92 0.27
External interests 132 123 0.07 0.25 140 132 0.06 0.23 119 112 0.06 0.24
Committee experience 132 64 1.24 1.44 140 60 1.24 1.33 119 82 0.56 0.95
Ideological distance 132 2 4.96 4.47 140 1 2.61 2.37 119 3 3.31 2.97
Number LPs 132 37 2.36 2.58 140 40 2.41 2.59 119 68 1.01 1.68






Table 4. Model summaries multiple-membership multilevel model of committee assignments in the Dáil (27th–31st legislative period).
Dependent variable:
Committee membership including transfers (only TDs)
27th Dáil 27th Dáil 28th Dáil 29th Dáil 30th Dáil 31st Dáil
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Fixed effects:
Prior education 0.420* 0.410 −0.130 −0.130 0.220 0.130 0.160 0.150 0.077 0.100 0.490* 0.490*
(0.250) (0.260) (0.270) (0.270) (0.250) (0.250) (0.240) (0.240) (0.210) (0.210) (0.260) (0.260)
Prior occupation 0.740*** 0.690*** 0.560** 0.550** 0.520** 0.560** 0.810*** 0.780*** 0.910*** 0.840*** 0.720*** 0.690***
(0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.190) (0.190) (0.260) (0.260)
Committee experience 1.500*** 0.390 1.400*** 0.910*** 1.300*** 1.400***
(0.300) (0.470) (0.220) (0.200) (0.180) (0.300)
High imp. com’s 0.560 0.580 0.390 0.380 0.340 0.320 0.063 0.062 0.019 0.054 −0.370 −0.390
(0.440) (0.470) (0.280) (0.280) (0.240) (0.250) (0.220) (0.220) (0.240) (0.250) (0.320) (0.320)
Ideol. distance 0.019* 0.020** 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.015 0.016 −0.018 −0.015 0.008 0.016
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026) (0.027) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.042) (0.042)
Number LPs −0.004 −0.006 −0.053 −0.053 −0.009 −0.020 −0.020 −0.033 −0.012 −0.016 −0.038 −0.091
(0.039) (0.040) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036) (0.025) (0.025) (0.060) (0.066)
Ideol. distance * HICs −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.008 −0.008 −0.013 −0.021 −0.018 −0.022 0.037 0.034 0.025 0.023
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.043) (0.044) (0.024) (0.024) (0.041) (0.042) (0.070) (0.071)
Number LPs * HICs −0.031 −0.040 0.006 0.006 −0.088* −0.090* −0.026 −0.018 −0.018 −0.034 0.026 0.053
(0.057) (0.059) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.059) (0.061) (0.049) (0.051) (0.098) (0.100)
Constant −2.000*** −2.100*** −1.900*** −1.900*** −1.900*** −1.900*** −2.200*** −2.200*** −2.100*** −2.200*** −2.100*** −2.200***
(0.320) (0.340) (0.190) (0.190) (0.160) (0.160) (0.140) (0.140) (0.130) (0.130) (0.190) (0.190)
Random effects:
Individual legislators (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Committees (0.549) (0.601) (0.229) (0.235) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,240 1,240 1,764 1,764 1,980 1,980 2,112 2,112 2,898 2,898 1,309 1,309
Log likelihood −545.000 −533.000 −698.000 −697.000 −806.000 −787.000 −746.000 −737.000 −1,039.000 −1,015.000 −458.000 −449.000
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,110.000 1,088.000 1,415.000 1,416.000 1,632.000 1,596.000 1,512.000 1,496.000 2,098.000 2,053.000 936.000 920.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,161.000 1,144.000 1,470.000 1,477.000 1,687.000 1,658.000 1,568.000 1,558.000 2,158.000 2,119.000 988.000 977.000
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.










The Dáil frequently has small parliamentary party groups (‘small’ here refers
to parliamentary party groups whose number of legislators is smaller than the
number of specialised committees). To test for a possible bias a separate
model was estimated including only large parliamentary party groups. It is
expected that the effect is stronger when only larger parliamentary party
groups are included. Small parliamentary party groups do not have similar
possibilities to choose among their legislators but have to ‘work with’ what
they have.12
The results of the multiple membership multilevel model show relatively
stable effects across legislative periods. The strongest effect for all legislative
periods relates to committee experience, suggesting that TDs who have been
on a committee in the prior legislative period are likely to continue on the
same committee. In order to estimate how much it ‘matters’ in terms of an
increased likelihood of being assigned to a committee, predicted probabilities
were calculated.13 The discussion is limited to calculations for the last ‘com-
plete’ legislative period before I conducted my fieldwork (30th Dáil 2007–
2011)14 In the 30th Dáil, the predicted probability of being re-assigned to a
committee is 21,0 per cent.
The interviews underline the statistical finding. A TD argued that, if
someone has served on the committee and preferred to stay on the commit-
tee, then ‘efforts would be made to facilitate that’ (Interview Dáil, 141202D).
However, the main reason to be able to stay on a committee depends on
whether somebody did a ‘good’ job. If this was the case then it is possible
to continue. The presence of this pattern is interesting, as it was hitherto
unconsidered in earlier studies and is present despite the fact that the
leader decides with great autonomy.
The effect of ‘advantages in knowledge’ of legislators
The model summaries do not show any influence of prior education but
suggest a relationship between prior occupation and committee membership
(Hypothesis 2). Legislators with relevant knowledge to the subject area of a
committee are more likely to be assigned to the corresponding committee.
This finding ties in nicely with the earlier results by Hansen (2011) with
regard to sector knowledge in high importance committees but extends it
to all committees. The predicted probability indicates how much ‘real’ advan-
tage a legislator has. In the 30th Dáil, the predicted probabilities to be
assigned to a committee with matching prior occupation are 12.0 per cent
(model 1) and 11.0 per cent (model 2), much higher than the predicted prob-
abilities of prior education (non-existent in model 1 and only 1.2 per cent in
model 2). These predicted probabilities remain virtually the same when
only including large parliamentary party groups. The explanatory power of
a TD’s occupational background indicates that the process is not only a
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top-down approach of parliamentary party group leaders dictating committee
allocations without any consideration of the TD’s background.
This result was backed up in the interviews. Most legislators indicated that
they were assigned to topics resonating with their skills and strengths (see,
e.g. Interview Dáil, 141202B; 141203A; 141204A; 141209A; 141211A). When
asked whether it mattered that there is a link between the occupational back-
ground and the committee of the TD, one legislator answered: ‘I would hope
that this is the motivation behind it’ (Interview Dáil, 141209A). Even if a legis-
lator’s personal occupational background did not explain their own assign-
ment, legislators could give examples of their colleagues. Note that
familiarity with a topic can also stem from other areas, e.g. experience gath-
ered on the local level (e.g. Interview Dáil, 141209B). The occupational past
may, however, in some cases be detrimental to the chances of being assigned
to a committee, if someone was seen to be ‘too’ involved and may, therefore,
have a lack of objectivity (Interview Dáil, 141203E). Despite these exceptions,
there is a strong case to be made that the prediction of the informational
rationale fits the committee assignments in the Dáil.
District characteristics and ‘outlying’ committees
A distributive rationale predicts assignments to be driven by district character-
istics. As I was unable to statistically test this hypothesis, the evidence relies on
the self-report of legislators during the interviews. Irish TDs are characterised
by having a strong local focus which structures their work (Farrell et al. 2012).
During the interviews, the constituency link indeed was a reoccurring factor.
Constituency work is clearly reflected in the choice of committees; it is a TDs’
‘job […] to represent his or her constituency’ (Interview Dáil, 141202A). Being
on a committee that represents the interests of a constituency was character-
ised as ‘very, very typical’ (Interview Dáil, 141202A). TDs were able to point to
links between constituency characteristics and a fitting committee, e.g. TDs
from urban constituencies were seen to be more drawn to the urban planning
and housing committee (Interview Dáil, 141203D) or the justice committee
(Interview Dáil, 141204B) due to crime rates. TDs from inner city areas with
a high unemployment rate would tend to the Committee on Jobs, Enterprise
and Innovation (Interview Dáil, 141204C). This strengthens and extends the
conclusion by Hansen (2011: 355) who argued that TDs elected to rural con-
stituencies seek appointments to the committees that deal with issues of
great relevance to the constituency. The presence of particular institutions
was enough to ‘qualify’:
If [a TD] has, for example, Curragh Camp [the biggest army barracks in Ireland] in
the middle of his constituency, then he might have an interest in it [the Defence
Committee]. Because there are a lot of votes there and he represents them. […].
Somebody from Mayo, where there are no army barracks within 100 miles,
would not want to be on the Defence Committee. (Interview Dáil, 141202A)
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The question arises how important committee work is for individual TDs in
serving his or her constituency. According to the distributive theory , commit-
tee membership facilitates their re-election chances. Irish legislators, however,
were sceptical about this. One respondent argued that committees ‘have no
value’ for electoral success (Interview Dáil, 141205B). Committees deal with
the nuts-and-bolts of policy-making in which voters are not particularly inter-
ested (Interview Dáil, 141205A) and ‘[…] people would not naturally gravitate
towards you because of your committee membership’ (Interview Dáil,
141204B). Although these self-reports should be interpreted with caution,
the assessment was shared by multiple legislators.
There was very little evidence that TDs actively campaign with their com-
mittee membership. Only a few indicated that their membership to a commit-
tee is something that they advertise in their communication with their
constituents (Interview Dáil, 141202B, also 141204C). Instead, most inter-
viewed TDs highlighted the existence of two independent spheres (see also
Farrell et al. 2012). Their task in the constituencies is very different from
their task in the Dáil. One TD argued to do ‘my best to keep it national
when I am in the parliament and similarly to keep it local when I am back
home’ (Interview Dáil, 141204C). The workload was seen as very high (Inter-
view Dáil, 141204C; 141203E) and the sometimes very technical content of
committee work has little added value for a TD with regard to his or her con-
stituents. It is hardly possible to work on a particular problem for a district in
committee. Subsequently, committee work does not have a very high status
and committee attendance is poor (Interview Dáil, 141204C; 141203E). One
legislator was very blunt about this: ‘Committee work is there and something
you have to do, but in terms of priorities: I mean if the choice is between being
at a committee meeting and your constituency, everybody would be in the
constituencies’ (Interview Dáil, 141204B).
Why would legislators join committees which resonate with the character-
istics of their districts even though there is little electoral value? The answer to
this question still lies in the interactions with constituents: Despite the fact
that TDs are not able to work for the constituency via the committee
system, committees are the primary source of actual information on an
issue. Legislators seem to anticipate that, next to questions about actual
affairs, they will receive questions on topics close to the committee’s jurisdic-
tion. TDs were able to recall instances in which they were approached by
groups of constituents or individual constituents with requests which fitted
with their committee membership (Interview Dáil, 141204A; 141204B).
Evidence of a leadership-controlled composition of committees?
Similar to the analysis by Hansen (2011) who tested the effect of seniority on
the likelihood of being assigned to high-importance committees, the results
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do not indicate a significant impact concerning the partisan variables. Neither
the ideological distance between a legislator and the parliamentary party
group, nor the number of legislative periods served have an effect on being
assigned to important committees. Some outliers with regard to ideological
distance can be found in the models of the 27th Dáil under the ‘old’ commit-
tee system, but even here the effect is weak. When excluding small parliamen-
tary party groups there is no evidence that these variables predict
membership of highly salient committees, either.
The interviews underline this finding. Legislators rather highlighted the occu-
pational background as well as the constituency link. The only frequently men-
tioned factor in which seniority plays a role concerns the distribution of
committee chairs (Interview Dáil, 141202B). It was argued to be ‘very unusual’
(Interview Dáil, 141203D) for a freshman to be assigned as chair. It became
apparent from the interviews that the assignment follows a certain sequential
pattern: First, ministers and junior ministers are appointed from the pool of TDs,
followed by committee chairs and vice chairs.15 Only then ‘regular’ committee
members are assigned (Interview Dáil, 141202B). The former two groups,
(junior) ministers and (vice) chairs, are likely disproportionally stacked with
more experienced legislators. This explains why the assignment of committee
members is not particularly influenced by this factor anymore. Given the
small size of the legislature (166 seats) a reduction of 30 TDs (i.e. 15 Ministers
including Taoiseach and Tánaiste as well as 15 Ministers of State) does not
leave much variation in the data. To put it bluntly, there are simply too few
experienced TDs available to be assigned to committees.
‘Beyond the theoretical framework’: Dáil-specific influences
The interviews also aimed to discover more country-specific influences.
Respondents pointed towards a ‘tradition’ (Interview Dáil, 141202A) that
former ministers would not join the corresponding committee after their
term is over. To do so is seen as ‘bad style’ since this would mean that
one would control those with whom one has worked before (see
Mickler 2013 for similar considerations by legislators in the German Bun-
destag). This ties in nicely with the non-finding regarding this variable
of Hansen (2011).
Constituency factors were mentioned in a rather unexpected way during
the interviews. Opposition parties sometimes seem to pursue a strategy to
‘assign an individual with a personality to do the most damage to the minister
[…] and it is quite effective when the minister and the opposition spokesper-
son share a constituency’ (Interview Dáil, 141205B). Another legislator argued
that the assignment to the preferred committee was based on the pragmatic
reason to counter a disadvantage that the legislator would otherwise have in
the upcoming election:
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My constituency colleague in my parliamentary party group became a junior min-
ister. And I made the point that I need to be given something in order to work on
my profile andmy knowledge. So I can be a better TD and this is the only way to do
it. So he [the parliamentary party group leader] said OK. (Interview Dáil, 151203C)
Conclusion: specialisation and committee experience paired
with country-specific patterns
Parliaments are complex institutions which work through various institutiona-
lised sub-groups. Committees are of major importance in this regard. This
makes it important to understand the assignment process of legislators to
committees. In the most thorough analysis of this issue in the Dáil hitherto,
Hansen (2011) focused primarily on participation in committees. His analysis
of committee assignments did not find stable patterns, letting him conclude
that the assignment happens rather randomly. This analysis builds up on the
earlier study by focusing exclusively on assignments to all committees. Using
a new data set and approach it was tested whether regularities and patterns
can be determined. Although there is no single and general guideline for the
allocation of committee seats, one fundamental conclusion of this paper is
that committee assignments in the Dáil are not so random after all.
This study built on the congressional framework of distributive, informa-
tional and partisan theories of legislative organisation. There is not yet a
‘home-grown’ theoretical framework available for European parliamentary
multi-party systems comparable to these U.S. theories. Some scholars have
been sceptical about the merit of the congressional theories outside of the
US. However, I concur with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe – why look so far
afield when there is so much close at hand?.16 Legislatures outside the U.S.
provide an additional ground for testing predictions of the congressional the-
ories. In order to account for the different institutional setting, the role of par-
liamentary party groups as central gatekeepers in the assignment process was
acknowledged. The general concepts of the congressional theories func-
tioned as heuristic devices to disentangle organisational rationales.
The analysis relied on a fruitful combination of statistical analysis and inter-
views. The initial results from the statistical analysis laid the foundation for the
interviews. Each respondent supported at least one of the rationales and the
corresponding factors. In general, the decision on ‘who gets what’ is mostly
taken directly by the leadership, but assignment patterns are recurring. This
is visible in the results of the statistical analysis as well as the interviews. No
legislator indicated that allocation patterns are random or change after
every election.
With regard to the performance of the congressional theories, a mixed
picture emerges from the analysis. There is no strong evidence for all organ-
isational implications of the congressional theories. On the one hand, the
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partisan theory did not help us to understand the committee assignment
process in the Dáil. One possibility for this non-finding could be that the
effect was tested in the ‘wrong’ place and that committees which have a
higher internal prestige (i.e. the Foreign Affairs Committee) are structured
according to partisan rationales. Another explanation would be that the
amount of partisan ‘stacking’ is indeed limited. The interviews provided evi-
dence that, in some cases, more experienced legislators have higher
chances to be assigned to more ‘central’ committees, but there is no
‘greasy pole’. This is an important finding. When transferring the congres-
sional theories to countries with strong parliamentary party groups, the
absence of a ‘tight’ grip of the parliamentary party group leadership is
unexpected.
On the other hand, the informational rationale provided additional insight.
Advantages in knowledge increase the likelihood of a legislator to be assigned
to a corresponding committee. Parliamentary party group leaders try to ‘tap
the talents’ of their legislators. Additionally, the interviews with legislators
highlighted factors ascribed to the distributive rationale, at least when it
comes to the assignments. Constituency characteristics can be linked to
large portions of the assignment process in the Dáil. However, the rationale
has its limitations in terms of whether it actually matters TDs’ re-election
chances. The electoral benefits of committee membership is a core part of
the theory, but it does not seem to hold for the Irish case: Voters do not per-
ceive committee work with a high importance and centrality. The impossibility
to test the effect of external interests on committee assignments in the Dáil
due to the low number of reported directorships, is an interesting finding
in itself. If there are no data to support this claim, then such a rationale
cannot be an important factor. The evidence presented here, therefore,
does point toward the congressional theories being more useful than what
is discussed in Hansen (2011). The analysis further provided evidence that
committee experience weighs heavily into the assignment process.
The interviews showed some important additional informal rules which are
more or less severe and restrict the number of possible assignments. The pres-
ence of several country-specific factors is an important revelation with impli-
cations for studies trying to broaden the evidence of this study towards
workings of specialised committees in other legislatures. Although the event-
ual goal of our endeavour to study parliaments needs to be to generalise our
findings on rules and proceedings, we need to leave some room for these dis-
tinct mechanisms as an addition to the general framework. Future research
should also look more closely into differences between parliamentary party
groups. In any case, the congressional theories will help to approach these
cases.
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Notes
1. Some MPs do not serve on a committee at all. Those legislators who are not on a
committee are taken out of the data set and are not analysed. The ‘non’-mem-
bership of not-assigned legislators is usually easy to explain, being mostly
members of the executive or having other time-demanding positions within
the parliamentary party group.
2. Multilevel modelling can be thought of a generalisation of linear regression,
where intercepts and slopes are allowed to vary by group.
3. Fine Gael n=6 TDs, Labour n=7, TG n=4, Fianna Fáil n=3, Sinn Féin n=2.
4. Used for committee experience.
5. Laver and Benoit (2002) analyse speeches by Irish TDs during a debate of con-
fidence in October 1991. Bernauer and Bräuninger (2009) applied Wordscores
to speeches in the 15th German Bundestag and to estimate policy positions
of legislators.
6. I was unable to obtain a copy of the manifestos of the Progressive Democrats (‘A
new hope’) and for Fine Gael (‘Securing a safer society’) for the 1997 General
Election. Both of these files were substituted with the manifestos of the 1992
General Election.
7. The word frequency matrix needed for the analysis was set up using the ‘tm
text mining package’ in R (Feinerer and Hornik 2015). The computation
of scores was done using the austin package (Lowe 2015).
8. This was tested by comparing the standard deviation of the rescaled Wordscores
scores of members of one parliamentary party group to that of all members of a
particular committee.
9. Assuming there are 20 committees, whether the 15th most important commit-
tee is slightly more important than the 16th is redundant information.
10. The ranking of committees for every parliamentary party group can be obtained
from the author.
11. Committee experience, prior occupation, prior education and external inter-
ests (all corresponding to each committee, 0 = not present, 1 = present) and
two cross-level interactions between a TD’s loyalty and the number of leg-
islative periods with committee importance per parliamentary party group.
The main effects are not further discussed but need to be included in the
model as it may otherwise lead to inferential errors, see Brambor et al.
(2005). The models were, for testing purposes, also estimated using the
Druckman and Warwick (2005) scores. In no instance this changed the sig-
nificance levels of the models.
12. The results of this analysis are restricted to the discussion in text, the detailed
output can be obtained from the author.
13. This was done using the Zelig package in R (Imai et al. 2008).
14. All predicted probabilities for all other legislative periods can be obtained from
the author.
15. Martin (2014b) refers to positions such as (junior) ministers, committee (vice)
chairs in Ireland as ‘mega-seats’ and shows that the mechanism for allocat-
ing these positions has a significant influence on the behaviour of
legislators.
16. Translated from the German original phrase ‘Warum in die Ferne schweifen?
Sieh, das Gute liegt so nah’.
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Appendix
Table A1. Percentage of Members of Dáil Éireann declaring ‘Nil’ in occupational income,
directorships and remunerated positions (1998–2010).
’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10
Occupational Income 45.4 46.1 46.0 46.4 43.4 43.9 47.2 48.5 38.7 45.7 44.9 49.4
Directorships 74.2 70.3 69.9 67.5 66.3 73.2 71.8 69.3 73.0 75.6 75.2 75.0
Remunerated Positions 95.7 95.8 96.9 94.0 96.4 97.0 100 99.4 100 97.0 97.6 97.0
Source: Own calculation, Register of Members’ Interest obtained from http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.
asp?m=&DocID=-1&CatID=20, access date: March 17, 2014.
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